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Abstract: This paper presents a historical overview of the 
dynamics of inter-religious relations in South Kalimantan. 
Early conversion to Islam in the 16th century, and more 
intensive Islamization by the 18th century, can be seen as 
the formative period of Islam in this region. The encounter 
and clash between the new religion and the existing beliefs 
and practices were unavoidable. By the late 19th century, 
the clash seems to move to another target, namely the 
colonial power associated with Christianity. By this period, 
Islam was transformed from the court into a people 
movement against the colonial power. By the first half of 
the 20th century, the problem of the 18th century apparently 
reappeared but in another form, namely the clash between 
puritan and traditional Islam. The making of the 
Indonesian nation state by the second half of the 20th 
century pushed the Banjarese Muslims to be involved in 
the ideological debates, and even in a rebellion against the 
state. During the Soeharto period, Muslim-Christian 
tensions at the national politics also influenced this region. 
Finally, in the Reformation Era, the Muslims in the 
province face serious challenges of intra- and inter-religious 
plurality.  
Keywords: South Kalimantan, Banjarese, Muslim-
Christian, inter-religious relations. 
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Introduction  
South Kalimantan is the oldest among the present five provinces 
of Kalimantan, the Indonesian parts of Borneo. In terms of ethnicity, 
most people of South Kalimantan are Banjarese, the tenth largest 
ethnic group in Indonesia.2 Like Malay identity, the Banjarese are 
generally identified as Muslim. The statistics of 2010 indicates that 
99.55% of Banjarese are Muslim. This is in line with the fact that 
Muslims comprise 97% of South Kalimantan population, and it is one 
of the 23 provinces in Indonesia categorized as exclusively Muslim. On 
the other hand, there are religious minorities in the region, including 
Protestants (1.33%), Catholics (0.44%), Buddhists (0.32%) and Hindus 
(0.44%).3 Most of the Christians live in Banjarmasin, the capital of the 
province. The number of the Protestants is also significant in 
Banjarbaru municipality and Kotabaru district. The highest Hindu 
adherents are found in Central Hulu Sungai district, while most 
Buddhists are found in Banjarmasin and Balangan district.4  
In general, like in many other places of the world, South 
Kalimantan is a plural society. The plurality of religion in this province 
is partly because of migration of people from the other parts of 
Indonesia. Many of them came to the region through the government 
transmigration program, and some of them by their own initiative. 
There are certainly some new converts, especially to Christianity and 
Buddhism. The Hindus are mostly adherents of local religion called 
‘Kaharingan’ and ‘Balian’ considered by the state as a Hindu variant. 
There are also a few numbers of Balinese Hindus who migrated to this 
region. Moreover, the Muslim majority are not homogenous either. 
There are various Islamic groups in the region including the 
traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the reformist Muhammadiyah 
and Al-Washliyah, and the other groups such as Salafi-Wahabi, 
Lembaga Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (LDII), Ahmadiyah, Hizbut 
Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Front Pembela Islam (FPI) and Shiah. 
                                                          
2 Leo Suryadinata, Avi Nurvidya Arifin and Aris Ananta, Indonesia’s Population: Ethnicity 
and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape (Singapore: ISEAS, 2003), pp. 31-68. 
3 Aris Ananta, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, M. Sairi Hasbullah, Nur Budi Handayani and Agus 
Pamono, Demography of Indonesia’s Ethnicity (Singapore: ISEAS, 2015), pp. 263; 267; 270. 
4 BPS Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Selatan dalam Angka 2015 (Banjarmasin: BPS 
Kalimantan Selatan, 2015), pp. 146-150. 
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This paper discusses the dynamics of inter-religious relations in the 
region by highlighting some important cases occurred from the 18th 
century up to the present. The ‘inter-religious’ here refers to the 
interaction between different religious groups of the same or different 
religions. In other words, the discussion will analyze the dynamics of 
relations among religious groups within Islam as well as between Islam 
and other religions. It is a historical overview described within the 
framework of continuities and changes along the period in question.  
 
Islamization vis-a-vis Pre-Islamic Beliefs and Practices 
According to Hikayat Banjar compiled by J.J. Ras,5 the first 
kingdom in South Kalimantan was Tanjungpura, located in Tanjung 
and established by Malay migrants of Sriwijaya Kingdom who followed 
Buddhism. In the 13th century, the migrants from Java also established 
a kingdom called Negara Dipa in Amuntai, and they embraced 
Hinduism. Thus, it can be said that earlier kingdoms in the region were 
influenced by Buddhism and Hinduism. Conversion to Islam occurred 
later in the 16th century. The first sultan who converted to Islam was 
Sultan Suriansyah (d.1550). We are told that the Banjarese Kingdom 
was taken over by the uncle of the crown prince. The crown prince's 
name is Samudera and his uncle called Temenggung. As a child, 
Samudera was saved by Patih Masih and lived with ordinary people in 
a village. When he became adult, Samudera wanted to take over the 
power from his uncle. He then asked the Islamic Sultanate of Demak, 
East Java, for military aid. The latter agreed on condition that the 
prince and his followers had to convert to Islam. With the military aid 
from Demak, Prince Samudera was confident to wage the war against 
his uncle. The war, however, finally did not take much bloodshed 
because the uncle, having looked at his nephew and talked to him, 
decided to surrender and returned the crown. Prince Samudera then 
converted to Islam and changed his name into Suriansyah. He was the 
first sultan of the Banjarese Sultanate. 
The story of the conversion indicates clearly that it was political.6 
The story may also indicate that the coming of Islam to this region was 
                                                          
5 J.J. Ras, Hikajat Bandjar: A Study in Malay Historiography (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1968). 
6 For an analysis of different conversion myths in Indonesia, see Russel Jones, “Ten 
Conversion Myths from Indonesia” in Nehemia Levtzion (ed.), Conversion to Islam 
(New York: Holmes & Maier, 1979), pp. 129-158. 
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not totally in a peaceful way. This is in contrast to the common claim 
that Islam came to Indonesia peacefully through trade activities. It was 
also a top-down process, that is, conversion of a king followed by his 
subjects. It was probably still a formal conversion without deep 
understanding of beliefs and practices of Islam. However, the story 
also tells us, a man called Khatib Dayyan, was sent to the court, to 
teach Islam. Khatib Dayyan was probably not the only Islamic teacher 
came to this region. The fact that intensive Islamization already started 
by the 13 century in Sumatra, especially Aceh, it was very likely that 
other Islamic propagators also came to this region, earlier than Khatib 
Dayyan.7   
The intensive Islamization of South Kalimantan was probably 
started by the 18th century. The most important man behind the 
Islamization was Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari (1710-1812). Sultan 
Tamjidillah I (d. 1767) sent him to Mecca and Medina to perform hajj 
and to learn all branches of Islamic traditional knowledge. After more 
than 30 years of study, he came back home and became the advisor to 
the Banjarese sultanate. The Sultan gave al-Banjari a piece of land 
called ‘Dalam Pagar’ (literally means ‘inside the fence’) where he lived 
and taught his students. Al-Banjari also wrote some Islamic books in 
Jawi (Malay language using Arabic characters), two of them are 
famous: Sabi >l al-Muhtadi >n on Islamic Jurisprudence, and Tuh}fat al-
Ra>ghibi >n on Islamic theology. 
There have been scholarly debates on the authorship of the Tuh}fat 
al-Ra>ghibi >n whether al-Banjari or Abd al-Shamad al-Palimbani (1737-
1832). As discussed elsewhere, the arguments that the work is written 
by al-Banjari are quite strong.8 Moreover, Bradely argues that Dawud 
al-Pattani (d. 1847) wrote a translation of al-Banjari’s Tuh}fat al-Ra>ghibi >n 
which includes the work of al-Palimbani as well.9 For Mal’an Abdullah, 
                                                          
7 For various arguments on this issue, see Yusliani Noor, Islamisasi Banjarmasin Abad ke-
15 sampai ke-19 (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2016). 
8 Noorhaidi Hasan, “The Tuhfat al-Raghibin: the Work of Abdul Samad al-Palimbani 
or Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari?” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land en Vulkenkunde Vol. 163 
No.1 (2007), pp. 67-85; and Mujiburrahman, “Islamic Theological Texts and Contexts 
in Banjarese Society: an Overview of the Existing Studies” Southeast Asian Studies Vol.3 
No.3 (December 2014): pp. 611-641. 
9 Francis R. Bradely, “The Social Dynamics of Islamic Revivalism in Southeast Asia, 
the Rise of Patani School 1785-1909,” Ph.D Thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison 
(2010), pp. 230-231. 
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this may indicate that each of al-Banjari and al-Palimbani wrote a 
different treatise under the same title.10 In any case, the Tuh}fat al-
Ra>ghibi >n is a very interesting work especially because it covers tensions 
between Islamic orthodox theology and local beliefs and practices. In 
other words, this treatise shows us the interaction between Islam and 
the existing local culture in South Kalimantan, especially among the 
Banjarese. 
In the treatise, al-Banjari describes the ritual practices called 
‘manyanggar’ and ‘mambuang pasilih’ as opposed to the Islamic beliefs. Al-
Banjari, however, does not give us the definitions of the rituals, 
probably because he assumes that the Banjarese in his age already 
knew them. In the dictionary of Banjarese language, manyanggar means 
to put offerings.11 Asywadie Syukur12 in his study of the Tuh}fat al-
Ra>ghibi >n explains that manyanggar is a ritual in which people give certain 
offerings to evil spirits to appease them, and to avoid their bad 
influences,13 while mambuang pasilih is also an offering ritual performed 
for a family who is believed to have a hidden brother or sister. The 
ritual is carried out to prevent the hidden person from harming the 
family.14  
                                                          
10 Mal’an Abdullah, Syaikh Abdus-Samad al-Palimbani, Biografi dan Warisan Keilmuan 
(Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pesantren, 2015), pp. 96-97. 
11 Abdul Djebar Hapip, Kamus Banjar-Indonesia (Banjarbaru: Grafika Wangi Kalimantan, 
2006), p. 164. 
12 M. Asywadie Syukur, “Naskah Risalah Tuhfatur Raghibin” Interim report 
(Banjarmasin: IAIN Antasari, 1990). 
13 A recent published book on Banjarese culture written by a number of scholars also 
mentions a ritual called manyanggar banua, which is by definition similar to manyanggar 
described by Syukur. If the two are identical, then the additional word banua (means 
region) is simply an explanation of the goal of the ritual, that is, to save people of a 
region (village) from disturbances of the evil spirits. See M. Suriansyah Ideham et al., 
Urang Banjar dan Kebudayaannya (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2015), pp. 85-86. 
14 In contrast, for Abu Daudi mambuang pasilih is a ritual of throwing away someone's 
cloth to free him/her from bad luck. Daudi seems to translate the word pasilih into 
cloth. In Banjarese language, basilih means to change cloth, but pasilih can be 
something else. Daudi does not mention any empirical evidence to support his 
definition, while Syukur refers to a research report published in 1978. See Abu Daudi, 
Transliterasi Kitab Tuhfaturraghibin (Martapura: Yapida, 2000), p. 70; and Asywadie 
Syukur, Pemikiran-Pemikiran Syekh Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari dalam BIdang Tauhid dan 
Tasawuf (Banjarmasin: Comdes, 2009), pp.10-16). The problem is, both manyaggar and 
mambuang pasilih are not practiced anymore. Alfani Daud who carried out a field 
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Al-Banjari attacks the two rituals because for him they are against 
Islamic teachings. For al-Banjari, the rituals are the practice of tabdzi >r, 
spending goods excessively (in the offerings) without benefits, and the 
beliefs that the rituals could influence one’s life is a kind of shirk, that 
is, associating God with other beings who have the power to control 
human life. Al-Banjari rejects the arguments of the actors of the rituals 
that the offerings were given to the unseen ancestors who spoke 
through a medium. For al-Banjari, in Islamic doctrines, the unseen 
creatures are either angles or satans. The fact that the rituals lead to 
tabdzi>r and shirk indicate that the unseen creature who receives the 
offerings should be satan. 
In the Tuh}fat al-Ra>ghibi >n, al-Banjari also criticizes a person 
pretending to be a Sufi but does not practice the Shari‘a. For him, 
based on al-Ghazali’s view, such a person deserves a death penalty. He 
said: 
Imam Ghazali said, if a saint assumes that there is a position 
between him and God that abolishes the obligation to perform 
daily prayers, and allows him to drink alcohol as it is believed by 
pretending Sufis, then there is no doubt about the necessity to kill 
him because of his apostasy, and killing such a person is better 
than killing a hundred of genuine unbelievers.15   
Al-Banjari's criticism of the local culture of rituals can be seen as 
evidence of tensions between Islamic orthodoxy and the existing pre-
Islamic beliefs and practices. Before the acceptance of Islam, the 
Banjarese kingdom followed Buddhism and Hinduism, and the local 
religion had not been totally replaced by Islam or the other world 
religions. In general, al-Banjari’s attack seems to be successful because 
both rituals are not practiced anymore. In addition, there are also some 
pre-Islamic rituals that have been Islamized, that is, by replacing their 
contents such as prayer and chanting with the Islamic ones.16 As we 
                                                                                                                          
research on Islam in Banjarese culture in 1980s did not mention them either. See 
Alfani Daud, Islam dan Masyarakat Banjar (Jakarta: PT Rajagrafindo 1997). 
15 Muhammad Arsyad al-Banjari, Tuh}fat al-Ra>ghibi>n (Banjarmasin: Toko Buku Murni, 
1983), p. 32. This quotation is obviously taken from Muhammad bin Muhammad al-
Ghazali, Faişal al-Tafriqah bain al-Islām wa al-Zandaqah (Damascus: Mathba’ah al-Şabāh, 
1993), p. 65. 
16 See Alfani Daud, “Islamisasi Upacara Mandi-Mandi di Kalangan Masyarakat Banjar” 
Religika No.1 Vol.1 (2000), pp. 69-92. 
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shall see, this kind of Islamized rituals have been accepted and 
practiced by the traditionalist Muslims but not by the reformists. 
Moreover, al-Banjari’s criticism of the mystics who claims to be 
beyond the shari'a law can be interpreted as a reaction to the existing 
pantheistic beliefs originated from Hinduism. Nevertheless, Asywadie 
Syukur presumes that al-Banjari’s statement quoted above was used by 
the Sultan to punish Abdul Hamid Abulung who allegedly embraced 
pantheistic beliefs.17 However, as we can see, there is no direct 
reference to Abulung's case in the text of Tuh}fat al-Ra>ghibi >n, and as far 
as I know, there is no historical evidence, apart from the oral tradition, 
that the case really happened. On the other hand, the legend of 
Abulung, as Steenbrink argues, can be a Banjarese version of al-Hallaj, 
similar to Siti Jenar as the Javanese one.18 In this regard, Feener argues 
that actually the legend of Siti Jenar, Abulung and the like is not 
directed against Hallajian doctrines, but against pantheistic views of 
Hinduism.19 Thus, we can say that both the text of Tuh}fat al-Ra>ghibi >n 
and the Abulung legend reflect the tensions between Islam and certain 
teachings of Hinduism that already existed in the region.20  
 
Islam versus Colonialism and Christianity 
By the 19th century, Islam seems to be more established in the 
Banjarmasin Sultanate. Many of al-Banjari's students spread out to 
different parts of South Kalimantan and beyond, to teach people the 
beliefs and practices of Islam. The presence of Islam was then formally 
stated in the Constitution of Sultan Adam (1771-1857) issued in 1835, 
dictating, among other things, that people of Banjarmasin Sultanate 
should follow the orthodox Sunni theology (as formulated earlier by al-
Banjari), and anybody deviates from it should be reported to the Sultan 
and should repent. The image of the intimate relationship between 
Islam and the Sultanate was eventually embodied in the person of the 
                                                          
17 Syukur, “Naskah Tufatur.”  
18 Karel A. Steenbrink, Beberapa Aspek tentang Islam di Indonesia Abad ke-19 (Jakarta: 
Bulan Bintang, 1984), p. 96. 
19 R. Michael Feener, “A Reexamination of the Place of al-Hallaj in the Development 
of Southeast Asian Islam,” Bijdragen tot de Tall-, Land end Vulkenkunde Vol. 154 No.4 
(1998), p. 578.  
20 For more discussion on this issue, see Mujiburrahman, “Islamic Theological Texts”, 
pp. 616-618.  
  
Mujiburrahman 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 11, Number 01, June 2017 
152 
Sultan himself. Sultan Adam, for instance, especially in his old age, was 
considered a saint by his people.21   
Like some other local kingdoms in the archipelago, the 
Banjarmasin Sultanate in the 19th century was under the Dutch colonial 
control. Earlier contacts between the Banjarmasin Sultanate and the 
Dutch for trade activities started by the late 16th century, and became 
more intense by the 17th century. The relationships between the parties 
fluctuated between conflicts and cooperation. By the first half of the 
19th century, however, the Dutch successfully forced the Sultan to sign 
contracts allowing the former to control certain areas of the Sultanate, 
and that any new Sultan cannot be crown without the Dutch 
endorsement.22  
In line with the history of colonialism, the Christian missionaries 
from Europe came to South and Central Kalimantan by the late 17th 
century. The early mission of the 17th and 18th centuries was not 
successful, and the missionaries were generally killed by the local 
people. The mission was to be more successful when Rheinische 
Missionsgessellschaft (RMG) from Germany started its works in the 
region by the 19th century. The missionaries developed certain 
strategies to attract people, especially the Dayaks, such as offering 
education and health services, establishing ‘kinship’ ties with local 
leaders through a certain Dayak ritual, and freeing those people who 
could not pay their debt.23  
In general, the Dutch did not have effective control over the 
Dayaks who lived in remote areas. Therefore, for mutual benefits, the 
cooperation between the Dutch colonial administration and the 
missionaries was necessary, even though each of them had different 
                                                          
21 Helius Sjamsuddin, Pegustian dan Temenggung:Akar Sosial, Politik, Etnis dan Dinasti 
Perlawanan di Kalimantan Selatan dan Kalimantan Tengah 1859-1906 (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 
2014), p. 113; Virginia Matheson “Conflict Without Resolution: the Banjarmasin War 
1859-1905,” Paper presented at the fourth Conference of Asian Studies Association of 
Australia, at Monash University, May 10-14 (1982), p. 3. 
22 Sjamsuddin, Pegustian dan Temenggung, pp. 66-80. For an interesting account of the 
local contacts with foreigners in the Banjarese Sultanate from a Japanese source, see 
Nomura Toru, “Magotaro: An Eighteenth Century Japanese Sailor’s Record of Insular 
Southeast Asia,” Sari 27 (2009), pp. 45–66. 
23 Sjamsuddin, Pegustian dan Temenggung, pp. 80-90; A. Eddy Kristiyanto, Sejarah 
Keuskupan Banjarmasin (Banjarbaru: Grafika Wangi, 2013), pp.49-54; Douglas Miles, 
Cutlass and the Crescent Moon: A Case Study of Social and Political Change in Outer Indonesia 
(Sydney: Center for Asian Studies, Sydney University, 1976), pp. 103-106. 
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goals. The fact that both missionaries and colonial administrators were 
white people who followed Christian beliefs made this cooperation 
more natural. This was probably the reason why the Banjarese put 
both the Dutch colonialists and the missionaries in the same boat as 
the Christian enemy. In other words, the religious identity became 
strongly political in which the Banjarese identified themselves as 
Muslims versus the Dutch and European Christians. 
The Banjarese War (1859-1906) was evidence of the significance of 
religious identities involved, especially for the local Muslim ‘rebels’.24 
The war started with the political crisis in the court on the question of 
succession. In 1825, Sultan Adam appointed his oldest son, Abdul 
Rakhman, as a crown prince holding a position as a young sultan. 
However, Abdul Rakhman passed away in 1852 while the very old 
Sultan Adam was still alive. There were three candidates competing to 
be the successor of Sultan Adam: Tamjidillah, Hidayatullah and Prabu 
Anom. The Dutch preferred Tamjidillah to the other candidates. The 
Sultan favored Hidayatullah, while his wife, Queen Kemala Sari wanted 
his youngest son, Prabu Anom. The Dutch finally forced its will, 
appointing Tamjidillah as the next crown prince. The Banjarese people, 
however, were disappointed with the Tamjidillah appointment. They 
did not like him because he was not a pious Muslim. He liked alcoholic 
drinks and followed European lifestyle. He also did not feel disturbed 
by the fact that his two sisters lived together with European men 
without marriage. In contrast, Hidayatullah was a pious man and close 
to the people. Moreover, his mother was among the aristocrat family, 
while Tamjidillah’s mother was not. 
The war finally broke in 1859, and the Dutch decided to abolish 
the Banjarese Sultanate by the next year (1860). The war was initially 
led by Antasari (1809-1862), another neglected prince who had 
sympathy with Hidayatullah. In the beginning, the ‘rebels’ attacked a 
coal mining in Pengaron controlled by a Dutch company called Oranje 
Nassau. The Christian missionaries and their families were also 
attacked. Many of them were killed and some of them successfully 
escaped. Many of the Antasari supporters were the hajjis, people who 
                                                          
24 The following summary of the war is taken from Helius Sjamsuddin’s Pegustian dan 
Temenggung, so far the most comprehensive study of the subject. The earliest study of 
the war in English is probably M. Idwar Saleh, “Agrarian Radicalism and Movements 
of Native Insurrection in South Kalimantan,” Archipel Vol. 9 (1975), pp. 135-153. 
Another study is by Matheson, “Conflict Without Resolution”. 
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already performed the Muslim ritual of hajj in Mecca. According to the 
Dutch reports, in the 19th century, a high number of Banjarese (even 
the highest in the Dutch Indies) went for pilgrimage. These people 
were relatively prosperous and lived a pious life. Most of the hajjis, 
especially those who lived in villages and far from the capital 
Banjarmasin, were haters of the Dutch perceived as Christian 
colonialists. Moreover, Antasari was supported by the so-called Beratib 
Beamal movement. This movement was probably a Sufi Order.25 By 
performing a certain ritual and prayer, the followers of Beratib Beamal 
were said to be invulnerable and very brave to fight. They considered 
the war against the Dutch as jihad, a holy war against the infidels for 
which someone could die as a martyr deserving a happy life in the 
paradise.  
 
The Reformist versus the Traditionalist 
If the 18th century of Banjarese people contained the tensions 
between Islam and pre-Islamic beliefs and practices, and the 19th 
century between Islam and Christianity associated with colonialism, the 
first half of the 20th century came with another tension, namely 
between the traditionalist Islam versus the reformist one. This is, 
however, in a way can be seen as a continuity of the tension came up 
in the 18th century. 
The emergence of the Islamic reform movement in the Middle 
East and India eventually influenced the other Muslims in the world, 
including the people of the archipelago. As has been discussed, many 
                                                          
25 Helius Sjamsuddin speculates that it was a Naqshabandiyah Order based on a Dutch 
report on South Kalimantan in January 1889 which mentions this order's name but 
without direct reference to Beratib Beamal. Sjamsuddin, Pegustian dan Temenggung, pp. 
256-257. In contrast, Martin van Bruinessen assumes that Beratib Beamal was a 
Sammaniyah Order due to the fact that the name of Antasari's son who continued the 
war after the death of his father was Muhammad Seman, the name of the founder of 
the Sammaniyah. Moreover, the reading ritual of the hagiography of Syekh Samman is 
still common among the Banjarese. Martin van Bruinessen, Kitab Kuning, Pesantren dan 
Tarekat (Yogyakarta: Gading, 2012), pp. 381-382. It is noteworthy that Muhammad 
Arsyad al-Banjari was a student of Muhammad Samman when the former studied in 
Medina. Muhammad Zaini bin Abdul Ghani (1942-2005), the latest most influential 
ulama of al-Banjari's descents, started introducing the Sammaniyah Order to his 
followers in 1994. A. Athaillah, “Perkembangan Tarekat Sammaniyah di Kalimantan 
Selatan,” Khazanah Vol.3 No.2 (2004), p. 227. On the other hand, the Naqshabandiyah 
Order has also developed in South Kalimantan, and before the 1994, more noticeable 
than the Sammaniyah.  
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Banjarese went to Mecca and Medina since the 18th century, not only 
to perform hajj but also to study Islam. By the late 19th century and 
early 20th century, many of the Banjarese also went to Cairo, to study 
Islam in the famous al-Azhar University. Like the other Muslims of the 
archipelago, the Banjarese went to Cairo partly to avoid the rise of the 
influence of the Wahabi reformist movement in Saudi Arabia. 
However, in al-Azhar, they also met Muhammad Abduh (1845-1905) 
and his student, Rashid Rida (1865-1935), the important reformist-
modernist leaders in that period.  
Moreover, in 1901, the Dutch colonial government introduced the 
so-called ‘Ethical Politics’, a policy to open the opportunities for the 
indigenous people to have modern education. This modern education 
eventually produced a new generation of leaders of the independent 
movement. The new generation established organizations based on 
Islamic and/or nationalist ethos. Among the Islamic organizations 
were Sarekat Islam, founded in 1912 in Surabaya, Muhammadiyah, 
founded in 1912 in Yogyakarta, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), founded 
in 1926 in Surabaya. In South Kalimantan, the first branch of Sarekat 
Islam was established in Banjarmasin in 1914, while the first branches 
of Muhammadiyah and NU were established in Alabio in 1925, and 
Martapura, in 1927, respectively. Later on, in 1931, a local traditionalist 
Muslim organization called ‘Musyawaratut Thalibin’ was also 
established. All of these organizations developed educational 
institutions, teaching religious as well as modern knowledge.26  
As described in Deliar Noer’s study,27 by the first decades of the 
20th century, tensions between the so-called ‘the young’ reformist (kaum 
muda) and ‘the old’ (kaum tua) traditionalists occurred in West Sumatra, 
South Sulawesi and Java. The reformists represented by 
Muhammadiyah and Persatuan Islam, while the traditionalists 
represented by Nahdlatul Ulama and Tarbiyah Islamiyah. In general, 
the reformists rejected all local religious practices originated from pre-
Islamic local culture. The traditionalists, on the other hand, accepted 
those practices because in their view, they were already Islamized. For 
the reformists, Muslims became backward because they still believed in 
                                                          
26 See Syaharuddin, “Organisasi Islam di Borneo Selatan 1912-1942: Awal Kesadaran 
Berbangsa Urang Banjar,” Master Thesis. Yogyakarta: Faculty of Humanities, Gadjah 
Mada University (2008). 
27 Deliar Noer, Gerakan Modern Islam di Indonesia 1900-1942 (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1980). 
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superstitions and supra-natural power other than God alone. For the 
traditionalists, the reformists were too simplistic in their understanding 
of Islam, ignoring the importance of relations between Islam and local 
culture. Both camps certainly used religious texts to support their 
respective positions. 
In South Kalimantan, the tensions also broke up. In 1926, in 
Amuntai, the colonial government even facilitated a forum for debate 
between the two camps. Idham Chalid (1922-2010) who was to 
become the national NU leader also said that in early 1930s, when he 
was still a child, he witnessed the tensions between followers of 
traditionalist and reformist ulama in Amuntai. The controversy was on 
how to perform the intention (niyyah) when someone starts the prayer 
ritual. Idham does not explain in detail this case. This type of 
controversy, however, is quite well known. For the traditionalist, in 
order to put the intention precisely in one’s heart, he or she could 
recite it (al-talaffuz}), while for the reformist the recitation should not be 
done because it is never taught by the prophet. Idham Chalid said that 
this controversy led to animosity, quarrel and even physical violence. 
In 1937, Idham Chalid studied in Nagara of South Hulu Sungai 
District where he also found another case of religious conflict, namely 
on the validity of Friday prayer in a newly built mosque. The 
controversy was on the precise distance between the old mosque and 
the new one. Some said, it already fulfilled the minimum distance 
according to the standard of the Shafi’ie school, while some others 
said, it did not. This controversy seems to be among the traditionalists 
themselves, that is, between the conservative and the progressive 
group.28   
Another case was the competition between the two camps to 
control over a mosque in Alabio in 1931 which eventually invited the 
colonial security guard to stop them. Probably because of this early 
tensions, up to now one can see the identification of mosques with the 
traditionalist Nahdlatul Ulama or the reformist Muhammadiyah in 
their respective nameplates. Usually, in South Kalimantan and 
probably in many other places in Indonesia, only the mosques of 
Muhammadiyah identified themselves in their nameplate, not those of 
the Nahdlatul Ulama. In 1946, a leader of the reformist camp in Alabio 
                                                          
28 Arief Mudatsir Mandan, Napak Tilas Pengabdian Idham Chalid (Jakarta: Pustaka 
Indonesia Satu, 2008), p.65 and pp. 68-69. 
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was arrested and then killed by the colonial security. Rumor said that 
he was reported by a traditionalist man to the Dutch authorities for his 
involvement in a rebellious movement against the Dutch. In 1949, a 
traditionalist ulama was kidnapped and killed by unknown people. 
Rumor said that it was a revenge of the 1946 case.29Apart from the 
credibility or falsity of the rumors, they clearly indicate that there were 
strong tensions, suspicions and even hatred between the two camps. 
 
Soekarno Era: the Politico-Ideological Tensions 
After the defeat of the Japanese from the Allied in the Second 
World War, Soekarno and Muhammad Hatta declared Indonesian 
Independence in Jakarta, 17 August 1945. However, this important 
event was not widely known in South Kalimantan, partly due to the 
scarcity of the means of communication. 30 The radios were previously 
seized by the Japanese colonialists. When the army of NICA 
(Netherlands Indies Civil Administration) came to South Kalimantan, 
the local aristocrats tended to submit themselves to the former boss 
rather than joining the republicans. Feeling concerned with this 
problem, some Banjarese who lived in Java sent a group of army from 
Surabaya to fight against the Dutch, but they were finally defeated. 
There were also a few sporadic attacks in Banjarmasin, but the Dutch 
could control the situation soon. 
A more organized opposition to the Dutch started by the late 
1946, when a division of marine of the Republican Army led by 
Hassan Basry waged a guerrilla war. Basry was a Banjarese, educated in 
the modern Islamic boarding school, Gontor, East Java. The guerilla 
war was quite disturbing for the Dutch, and Basry was difficult to find. 
He hid in the forest of the Meratus hills where the Dayaks lived. When 
the political negotiation of the nationalist leaders and the Dutch came 
to a compromise that a federal state to be established, on 17 May 1949, 
Hassan Basry declared South Kalimantan to be part of the United 
Indonesia, rejecting the federal idea. 
                                                          
29 Achmad Fedyani Saifuddin, Konflik dan Integrasi: Perbedaan Faham dalam Agama Islam 
(Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1986), pp. 55-57. 
30 The following account is based on Hassan Basry’s memoir, Kisah Gerila Kalimantan 
(Banjarmasin: Jajasan Lektur Lambung Mangkurat 1961). This is the first volume. In 
2003, the first and the second volumes were published together. See Hassan Basry, 
Kisah Gerilya Kalimantan Tahun 1945-1949 (Banjarmasin: Yayasan Bhakti Banua, 2003). 
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However, after the power hand over from the Dutch in the same 
year to the republican leaders took place, Hassan Basry seems to be 
marginalized. Instead of being appointed in a formal position, in 1950-
1953 he was sent to Cairo to study at al-Azhar University and 
American University. There is no doubt that he and his followers were 
disappointed. Having disappointed, one of his colleagues, Ibnu Hadjar, 
decided to fight against the new republic. Ibnu Hadjar called his group 
as Union of the Oppressed People (Kesatuan Rakjat jang Tertindas). This 
group eventually joined the Darul Islam movement, established by 
Kartosuwiryo in West Java. Ibnu Hadjar’s rebellion survived for about 
nine years (1950-1959). He was later reportedly executed by the 
government.31    
When Hassan Basry and his followers waged the guerrilla war, like 
Antasari movement of the 19th century, they believed that it was a holy 
war against the infidel Dutch. However, it did not necessarily mean 
that they wanted an Islamic ideology for the state. Likewise, Ibnu 
Hadjar’s decision to join the Darul Islam movement was much more 
motivated by disappointment with the government policy towards 
former guerilla armies rather than by the Islamic ideology. 
Nevertheless, Islam as a political identity was quite strong among the 
Banjarese, and therefore, Islamic ideology certainly attracted them. 
Two years before the first Indonesian elections, when Soekarno visited 
Amuntai in 27 January 1953, some people brought a banner written on 
it: Islamic or national state? In his speech, Soekarno openly spoke that 
for the unity of the whole nation, he favored the nationalist ideology.32 
In fact, the result of the elections of 1955 in South Kalimantan was in 
favor of the Islamic parties. NU and Masyumi obtained 48.6% and 
31.9% votes respectively.33 At the national level, during the 
                                                          
31 See C. van Dijk, Rebellions under the Banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia (Leiden: 
KITLV, 1981); Muhammad Iqbal “Kesatuan Rakjat yang Tertindas (KRjT): 
Pemberontakan Ibnu Hadjar di Kalimantan Selatan 1950-1963,” Master Thesis. 
Jakarta: Department of History, University of Indonesia (2014). 
32 For a specific study of the case, see Muhammad Iqbal, “Menyulut Api di Padang 
Ilalang: Pidato Politik Soekarno di Amuntai, 27 Januari 1953,” Undergraduate Thesis. 
Yogyakarta: Department of History, State University of Yogyakarta, 2009. 
33 Herbert Feith, Pemilihan Umum 1955 di Indonesia. Trans. Nugroho Katjasungkana, 
Masri Maris and Prakitri Simbolon (Jakarta: Kepustakaan Populer Gramedia, 1999), 
pp. 114-115. 
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Constituent Assembly following the elections, the two parties spoke 
for Islam as an ideology of the state.  
The Dayak people, particularly those who embraced Christianity or 
local religions of Balian and Kaharingan, were understandably worried 
about the Islamic political ideology. Many Dayaks also could not 
accept that the Banjarese, being more educated, dominated important 
government positions in the region. During the late Dutch colonial era, 
the Dayaks of Central Kalimantan used to ask for an independent 
government from the Banjarese. This demand was not entirely 
successful due to the coming of the Japanese interlude. During the 
revolutionary war, the Dayak elites tried to be a part of the ‘Dutch 
sponsored’ Federal States, but this also failed. The moment then came 
when Ibnu Hadjar rebellion emerged in the 1950s. By this time, the 
Dayaks organized themselves as the defenders of the state nationalist 
ideology, Pancasila. They then demanded the central government to 
give them a province separated from the Banjarese. This demand was 
finally accommodated by the Soekarno government in May 1957, and a 
new Central Kalimantan Province was established. The political 
struggle after the formal partition, however, was not free from 
violence.34   
 
Soeharto Era: From Fear of Christianization to Social Frustration 
The rise of Soeharto to power, following the abortive coup of 
1965, was strongly supported by the Islamic groups, especially the 
reformists. Nevertheless, Soeharto eventually marginalized the Islamic 
groups in the political stage. He refused the rehabilitation of the 
reformist Muslim party, the Masyumi, and did not allow former leaders 
of the Masyumi to lead the newly established party, Parmusi. Soeharto 
and the military also allied with the Christians and the secular oriented 
Muslims in opposing the Islamic ideological ambition of the Islamic 
groups.  
This Muslim political frustration was exacerbated by the effects of 
the mass killing of hundreds of thousands of the former communists 
and suspects. The communists were considered atheists, and therefore, 
against the state ideology, Pancasila, which recognizes the belief in 
God. In order to avoid the murder, many of the Javanese nominal 
Muslims (abangan) converted to one of the world religions, and a high 
                                                          
34 Miles, Cutlass and the Crescent Moon. 
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number of them converted to Christianity. The mass conversion to 
Christianity and the wave of foreign aid for missionary activities were 
reported in Western media. Having realized this issue, the leaders of 
the Islamic groups started worrying about what was to be called 
‘Christianization’, that is, Christian unfair efforts to convert Muslims. 
In 1967, the Muslims demanded the government to control foreign aid 
for religious institutions and to limit religious missions only to the 
people outside the ‘recognized’ (world) religions, but the Christians 
disagreed because for them the demands are against religious 
freedom.35  
The Muslim-Christian tensions at the national politics also echoed 
in Banjarmasin. In 19-21 April 1969, the Office of the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs, South Kalimantan Province, held a meeting with the 
leaders of religious groups.36 In this meeting, E. Saloh, a Protestant 
Minister of the Kalimantan Evangelical Church (GKE), said that he 
disagreed with the working paper presented in the meeting that 
religious mission should be limited only for those outside the followers 
of the recognized religions. For him, the target of religious mission 
should be all human beings, as it is dictated in the Bible.37 Saloh was 
the chairman of the GKE Synod (1962-1968), and the GKE is the 
biggest church in South and Central Kalimantan. Therefore, Saloh's 
voice was important and understandably, incited reactions. A 
prominent Muslim leader, Rafi'i Hamdie, interrupted and asked the 
chairman of the meeting to warn Saloh not to talk about issues that 
would lead to conflict and animosity. The chairman finally decided to 
stop the meeting. After the meeting, Islamic reformist student 
organizations such as Islamic Indonesian Students (PII), Association of 
Muslim Students (HMI) and Muhammadiyah Student Organization 
(IMM) released a statement of protest against Saloh’s remarks in the 
meeting. The national media of Muslim reformists such as Abadi 
                                                          
35 See Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened: Muslim-Christian Relations in Indonesia’s New 
Order (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006), Chapter 1. 
36 The following account is based on the document compiled by Pelajar Islam 
Indonesia (PII), Kristenisasi di Kalimantan Selatan (Peristiwa ‘Saloh’ dengan Rangkaianja) 
Bandjarmasin: PW PII Kalsel, 1969. See also Mujiburrahman, Mengindonesiakan Islam, 
Representasi dan Ideologi (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2008), pp. 378-390. 
37 In Indonesia, ‘the recognized religions’ mean those religions administered, protected 
and supported by the state. The religions are Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. 
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newspaper and Kiblat magazine also covered the story. On 13 May 
1969, both Catholic and Protestant leaders released a statement 
explaining Saloh’s position, namely that religious missions should be 
directed to all human beings through the ways that respect human 
rights and Pancasila values. The controversy did not immediately stop 
until the governor, the police and the army interfered.38  
Another case of the Muslim fear of Christianization was their 
opposition to the Assembly of the GKE Synod in 1988. It is 
noteworthy that at the national level, in 1975 the Islamic groups 
rejected the World Council of Church (WCC) Assembly to be held in 
Jakarta. The Assembly was finally cancelled and moved to Nairobi.39 
The case of GKE Synod Assembly was rather different. According to 
Darius Dubut,40 a GKE minister who attended the meeting, it was 
held in the House for Teacher Training (Balai Penataran Guru, BPG), 
Banjarbaru. At that time, Banjarbaru was still a part of the Banjar 
district and Martapura was the capital. Martapura is well-known as a 
Muslim dominated district and proudly calls itself the Veranda of 
Mecca. There was a rumor that the Assembly was to discuss a plan to 
build the biggest church in Kalimantan, to be located at the crossroad 
of Martapura and Banjarbaru. Therefore, the ulama and people from 
Martapura objected to the Synod Assembly.  
The regent of Banjar distict then invited the GKE leaders, the 
ulama and the government authorities. In that meeting, the GKE 
explained that the Synod Assembly was a cross-provincial event, and 
therefore, the permission was given by the Police National 
Headquarter. Because the Assembly already got the permission, the 
regent said that the local government should allow it to proceed. The 
protesters asked the regent to allow them to read their letter, but the 
regent disagreed. The letter was then given to the GKE leaders. Its 
content was simply a rejection of the Synod Assembly. Nevertheless, 
the GKE leaders decided to go on. 
                                                          
38 According to Ilham Masykuri, the son of Rafi'i Hamdie, the controversy stopped 
after a meeting in a cafe where Rafi'i Hamdie finally realized that he had a family tie 
with Saloh. 
39 Mujiburrahman, Feeling Threatened, pp. 62-69. 
40 The following account is based on my interview with Darius Dubut, 27 September 
2015. According to Dubut, all documents of the Assembly were lost because of fire. 
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The Assembly was opened on Tuesday evening. On Wednesday, a 
Muslim man came to the Assembly, asking to be allowed to participate, 
but the Synod rejected him. By Wednesday evening, a lot of polices 
and armies came to the area around the place of the Assembly, to 
guard it from people demonstrating against it. They were finally 
pushed by the securities to go back home. By Thursday, there was a 
rumor that after the Muslim Friday prayer, there would be a huge 
demonstration. The commander of the army base, in Banjarbaru, who 
happened to be a Batak Christian, suggested that the Assembly to be 
moved to the army base. The leaders of the GKE, however, decided to 
stay in the place, but they attempted at finishing the Assembly earlier 
than the schedule. So, the Assembly was finished on Friday morning, 
and they immediately came back home, guarded by the security forces.  
The last and most important case during the New Order period is 
the riot in Banjarmasin, on 23 May 1997. It was on Friday. I was riding 
a motorcycle to the State Institute of Islamic Studies (IAIN), Antasari 
through the Ahmad Yani Street. I was surprised to see many people, 
with green cloth written on it the symbol of Islamic party, PPP. They 
came and went without obeying the traffic rules. Some of them were 
holding a sword or a sickle. When I arrived at the IAIN, students told 
me that a riot happened at the center of the city. We then saw a black 
smoke of fire, climbing to the sky. I came back home. In the evening, I 
heard from the loud speaker of the mosque an announcement from 
the security that everybody was not allowed to go outside. 
What happened?41 According to the studies of the riot, the day was 
the last turn for the government party, Golkar, to campaign for the 
elections. For this reason, some ministers and high state officials came 
to Banjarmasin. On that Friday, Muslim males prayed in the Noor 
Mosque. Some of them prayed in the street close to the mosque. In the 
mid of the praying, a few motorcycles riders crossed the street, who 
were supposed to support the Golkar campaign, annoying the 
congregation. The people in the mosque were angry. They started 
                                                          
41 The following account is based on Hairus Salim, Amuk Banjarmasin (Jakarta: YLBHI, 
1997); Mochtar Mas'oed, Mochammad Maksum and Muhammad Soehadha (eds.), 
Kekerasan Kolektif, Kondisi dan Pemicu (Yogyakarta: P3PK Universitas Gadjah Mada, 
2000). See also Husnul Khotimah, “Collective Memory Jumat Kelabu di Kota Seribu 
Sungai (Studi Kasus Kerusuhan Sosial 23 Mei 1997 di Provinsi Kalimantan Selatan 
dalam Perspektif Bina Damai),” Master Thesis. Yogyakarta: Postgraduate Program, 
State Islamic University, Sunan Kalijaga (2016).  
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destroying any Golkar symbol and burned two Golkar offices. They 
also burned Mitra Plaza shopping center, and took goods inside. They 
then burned a lot of shops, especially those belong to Chinese. Later, 
places of religious worship also became their target. Five churches and 
three viharas were burned. In this riot, 121 persons were reportedly 
dead, and 123 were injured. Several reportedly disappeared. 
The riot was not religious, but religious symbols certainly played a 
part. During the New Order, South Kalimantan, especially Banjar-
masin, was the strong power base of the Islamic party, PPP. This is not 
surprising due to the fact that the president of the party was a 
Banjarese, Idham Chalid. The support for the PPP was also in line 
with the high vote for the Islamic parties in the 1955 elections. 
Nevertheless, during the New Order, as the government party, Golkar 
used any means to win the elections. After more than 30 years, the 
economic gaps between the few rich and the poor mass became wider 
and wider. People were trapped into political and economic frustration. 
Moreover, the national political elites were not totally in support of 
Soeharto anymore. He was too long in power, and people wanted a 
new leader. It was in this context that some observers said that the riot 
could be orchestrated by outsiders. However, even if there were 
provocateurs, the riot would not happen if the condition of the people 
was not ready for it.  
 
The Reformation Era: the Challenges of Plurality   
Since the fall of Soeharto in 1998, Indonesia has been developing 
into a democratic polity. Indeed, it could be argued that Indonesia is 
the most democratic Muslim country in the world today. At the same 
time, the country has witnessed the emergence of various Islamic 
groups, especially those with radical tendencies. The free public sphere 
of democracy has opened the door for the encounter of religious 
differences.   
South Kalimantan is not an exception. As has been discussed 
above, by the 18th century, Arsyad al-Banjari opposed the pre-Islamic 
beliefs and rituals, by the 19th century, Antasari fought against 
colonialism associated with Christianity, and by the 20th century, the 
reformist Muslims attacked some of the traditionalist Muslim beliefs 
and practices. All of these problems are still found now, but the 
plurality of religious groups and teachings have significantly increased. 
Within the Islamic community, there exist not only the traditionalist 
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NU and the reformist Muhammadiyah, but also Ahmadiyah, Shiah, 
Salafy, Islam Jamaah, Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Front 
Pembela Islam (FPI). Moreover, the adherents of religions other than 
Islam are also more present in the public sphere than before. With the 
rise of democracy, they seem to have more courage to show their 
objection to any discrimination and to speak for their rights as equal 
citizens. Inter-religious meetings have also been more often than 
before. 
The problem of internal plurality of Islamic community in South 
Kalimantan is quite crucial to solve. Tensions sometimes occur even 
among the well-educated people in a public seminar and discussion. 
Fortunately, as far as I know, violence never happens among them. 
One of the most outspoken Islamic group in this region is HTI whose 
followers mostly university students and mostly from ‘secular’ 
universities such as Lambung Mangkurat University and the Academy 
of Education and Teacher Training (STIKIP), and some of them from 
the State Islamic University (UIN). The discourses of the HTI ranging 
from global political issues, especially criticisms of the United States 
and Israel with all conspiracy theories, to the dream of establishing an 
international Islamic government under an Islamic leader, a khali>fa. 
One of the important political discourses of the HTI is that democracy 
is kufr (infidel). The HTI attracts young people since their high school 
years when they join Rohis (Kerohanian Islam, the Islamic Spritual 
Club). The activists of Rohis then join the Institute of Islamic 
Propagation in Campus called LDK (Lembaga Dakwah Kampus).42 
Some of them, however, start joining the group when they become 
university students. In general, the young people feel that the world is 
morally chaotic and politically unjust. They then find the Islamic 
ideology as the only alternative answer.  
I have several experiences to talk in a public discussion where the 
HTI activists participated. They are usually very enthusiast and 
sometimes their friends shout ‘Alla>hu Akbar’ (God is the Greatest). 
Elsewhere, I describe one of my personal experiences about this as 
quoted below.   
On one occasion, I was invited to be a moderator of a discussion 
on the issue of Islamic brotherhood. It was in Banjarbaru, a 
district 20 kilometers from the capital, Banjarmasin, South 
                                                          
42 It does not mean that all LDKs are HTI’s followers. 
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Kalimantan. The speakers were Muhammad al-Khattath, the 
national leader of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), Anwar Abbas, 
the national leader of Muhammadiyah, and Said Agiel Siradj, the 
leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). These three speakers were 
considered representatives of different Islamic organizations in 
Indonesia: the Muhammadiyah is reformist, the NU is 
traditionalist and the HTI is trans-nationalist. 
From the very beginning, the organizers realized that tensions 
could easily emerge. Therefore, they asked me as a moderator to 
manage the discussion in such a way that everybody could feel 
comfortable. Having made a few introductory remarks, I gave the 
first opportunity to al-Khattath. As the leader of the HTI, he 
explained that his organization’s primary work is in the field of 
politics. The HTI’s ambition is to achieve global unity of political 
Islam under the so-called ‘khilafah system’. For him, every Muslim 
should struggle for global political supremacy, and the enemy is 
apparently nothing other than the United States and Israel with 
their global capitalist economic hegemony. When the khilafah is 
established, Islamic law (shari >‘a) will be implemented. The second 
chance was given to Said Agiel. He said that NU accepted the 
Indonesian state, and that for NU, Pancasila is final. Pancasila can 
be accepted because it is in line with Islamic values. The state 
could accommodate Islamic rules if they are approved by the 
Parliament. However, to follow the shari’a, Muslims do not always 
need the state. He then attacked what he called ‘formal Islam’. 
”For you who have a beard, I will say that it is not an important 
mark of being a Muslim. Remember, Abu Jahal, the enemy of 
Prophet Muhammad, also had a beard. And you, Muslim women 
who wear the head covering. You must know that head covering 
is only one tiny rule in the Qur’an. Most of the Qur’anic teachings 
talk about justice, equality and protection of the weak,” Said Agiel 
said. 
The HTI activists and supporters, who heard Said Agiel Siradj’s 
remarks were hot and angry. Before giving a chance to Anwar 
Abbas to speak, I whispered to him. “Please try to calm down the 
situation!” He said, “Yes, do not worry!” Then I began. “Ladies 
and gentlemen, our last speaker is Anwar Abbas. He is an 
economist. We must listen to him because, it is possible that the 
different views between al-Khattat and Said Agiel are not that 
important compared to the economic problems.” Anwar Abbas 
then took his chance. He started with a kind of play. “Please 
answer ‘yes’ if you agree with my statement, and ‘no’ if you don’t.” 
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He then asked, “Do you agree that all Muslims in Indonesia 
should be rich?” “Yes....” said all participants together. “So, let’s 
forget our differences, and start thinking about our common 
interest: the economic interest.” Everybody then seems to feel 
relieved and laughed. The discussion afterwards was still hot, but 
did not lead to violence.43  
For the HTI and the like, however, a country will not become 
prosperous until it implements shari‘a law. This is actually one of the 
crucial issues during the first decade of the Reformation Era in several 
parts of Indonesia, including Banjarmasin.44 One of the issues incited 
public controversy was the so-called ‘Perda Ramadan’, a Regional 
Regulation for Ramadan, the Muslim fasting month.45 The major of 
Banjarmasin issued the Regulation in 2003, and then it was to be 
revised in 2005. The Regulation states that during Ramadan, (1) it is 
prohibited to open restaurant, food stall and entertainment houses; (2) 
it is also prohibited to eat, drink and smoke in restaurant, food stall 
and other public areas during the fasting hour. Everyone who sells 
food and drink in the public market are only allowed to open from 
15.00 in the afternoon. Anybody who breaks the regulation point 1, 
can be punished by maximum 3 months in jail or Rp 50 million fine at 
the maximum. Anybody who breaks point 2 can be punished by 
maximum 3 months in jail or Rp 7.5 million fine at the maximum.  
Mukhtar Sarman, a regular columnist for the local newspaper, 
Banjarmasin Post, published a column on 25 September 2006 entitled 
‘Bingung’ (Confused), criticizing the regulation. He was confused, he 
said, because of three reasons. First, he cannot understand why the 
government regulate religious obligation for citizens. For him, the duty 
of the state is to regulate public affairs, while fasting as a Muslim 
                                                          
43 Mujiburrahman, “Intra and Inter-Religious Dialogue in Contemporary Indonesia: a 
participant’s point of view,” Bulletin of Nanzan Center for Asia-Pacific Studies No.7 (June 
2012), pp. 10-11. 
44 Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly or Symptom?,” in 
Greg Fealy and Sally White (eds), Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia 
(Singapore: ISEAS 2008), pp. 174-191; Mujiburrahman, “The Politics of Shari‘a: The 
Struggle of the KPPSI in South Sulawesi,” in Martin van Bruinessen (ed.), Contemporary 
Developments of Indonesian Islam, Explaining the Conservative Turn (Singapore: ISEAS, 2013), 
pp. 145-189.  
45 The following account is based on the documents published in Mukhtar Sarman, 
Mencari Kebenaran, Menuai Kecaman di Balik Kontroversi Perda Ramadan (Banjarmasin: LK3 
and PK2PD, 2006).  
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religious obligation is a private issue. The regulation, he said, seems to 
force all Muslims to fast during the Ramadan. Second, if God wills, He 
can force everybody to fast, but He does not. The reason is, God 
allows people to choose to obey or disobey Him. Why then the 
government forces everybody to fast? In fact, there is no guarantee 
that by implementing the regulation, people will become more pious. 
The third, the government uses its Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja 
abbreviated as ‘Satpol PP’ (a kind of 'civilian' police of the regional 
government, not the national police) to control or arrest people who 
break the regulation. “Is Satpol PP the army of God commissioned to 
control the piety of people?” he asked. 
In response to Sarman's criticisms, on 2 October 2006, the Vice 
Major of Banjarmasin, Alwi Sahlan, published an article in Banjarmasin 
Post. First of all, he said that the regulation does not mean that the 
government forces all citizens to fast during Ramadan. It only 
prohibits people from eating and drinking publicly during the fasting 
hour. Anybody who wants to eat and drink, or does not want to fast 
privately, he or she is not covered by this regulation. Second, in Islam, 
religion and public affairs are not separated. It is true that Indonesia is 
not an Islamic state, but it is not secular either. There is a religious 
court in this country where Islamic family law is applied. Every 
government official should take an oath based on his/her religion. 
Thus, the regulation is in accordance with the state ideology, Pancasila. 
Third, to say that as if Satpol PP were the army of God is too much. 
For Sahlan, it is the duty of the Satpol PP, according to the law, to 
supervise the implementation of regional regulations.  
The polemics, however, did not continue in the newspaper, but the 
discussion proceeded among the NGO activists, especially at the 
Institute for Islam and Social Studies (LK3). Mukhtar Sarman then 
published a tiny book with LK3 on the subject. In this book, in 
addition to the above article, Sarman argues that it is the duty of the 
ulama, not the government, to educate people to obey religious 
obligations. He also said that, the regulation is against the interest of 
the poor, the marginalized people who open food stall for daily living, 
including in Ramadan. They usually respect those who fast by covering 
their food stall with cloth. This is called in Banjarese 'warung sakadup'. 
To be sure, Sarman was not alone, but the dominant view seems to 
support the regulation. On the other hand, the regulation seems to be 
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loosely implemented, and I have not heard about any who was put in 
jail because of breaking the regulation.  
The last important issue is inter-religious relations. As has been 
discussed, during the New Order period, there were cases in which 
Muslim and Christian leaders were in tensions, even though there was 
no violence broke up. The rioters of 1997 also burned the churches 
and viharas. Since the New Order period, there have been attempts at 
building inter-religious harmony by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, 
especially through dialogue programs. In Banjarmasin, there is the 
Academy of Theology of the GKE Church. In early 1990s, when I was 
still a student at the Ushuluddin Faculty of the IAIN Antasari, there 
was cooperation between the Academy and the IAIN, especially for 
having an access to the library of the Academy. The Academy also 
invited a lecturer from the IAIN to teach Islam. Inter-religious 
dialogue became more commonly held during the early years of the 
Reformation Era, primarily as a reaction to the Muslim-Christian 
bloody conflicts in Ambon and Poso. 
In the year 2006, the Minister of Home Affairs and the Minister of 
Religious Affairs issued a joint decree instructing the regional 
government to establish the so-called Inter-religious Harmony Forum 
(FKUB) at the provincial and district levels. In South Kalimantan, the 
FKUB was finally established in 2010. The members of the FKUB are 
representatives of the six religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, 
Buddhism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism). The FKUB is 
funded through the regional government budget. The government of 
South Kalimantan Province has been generous with the funding. 
Therefore, the FKUB could manage many activities such as inter-
religious dialogue on certain actual issues, workshops on conflict 
resolution, meetings of religious leaders, organizing a pilot project of 
inter-religious harmony in certain villages, and publications. One 
noticeable positive impact of these activities is that religious leaders 
have been in contacts and communication.  
In addition to the FKUB, the Ministry of Religious Affairs has 
continued its program on inter-religious dialogue. The participants of 
the program are usually religious leaders. However, more recently, the 
target of the program is mostly the young people, especially students 
of the Junior and Senior High Schools. The reason is, as has been 
mentioned, the young generation is more vulnerable to radical ideas 
and intolerant discourses. In 2015, the budget to build the office of the 
  
Inter-religious in South Kalimantan 
169 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 11, Number 01, June 2017 
FKUB in some districts of the province was cancelled and transferred 
into a program called ‘socialization of inter-religious harmony’ to 
students at schools. I was invited to talk for the program in some 
schools. I found that students of minority religions at the beginning 
were hesitant to speak, but later on they became more open. I found 
that the dialogue season was always lively. A few students who were 
infected by radical views sometimes also asked critical questions. 
Given the positive responses from the schools, the program seems to 
be continued by the following years. 
In addition to the government support, there are also activities of 
inter-religious meetings organized by private organizations. The most 
active is the LK3 mentioned above. The LK3 activists are mostly 
graduates from the IAIN (now UIN) Antasari or Lambung Mangkurat 
University. In carrying out its programs, the LK3 cooperates with 
Islamic, Protestant, Catholic, Buddhist or foreign institutions. They 
organized seminars, discussions, and publications. The most interesting 
and a bit controversial among Muslims is that the LK3 organizes a 
discussion in every Ramadan in cooperation with the Catholic Church, 
followed by fast breaking for Muslim participants. Besides the LK3, 
the most recent group concerned with inter-religious peace is the 
Gusdurian Network of South Kalimantan branch. The activists of the 
network come from different religious and ethnic backgrounds. As can 
be seen from its name, the Gusdurian network is intended to support 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s idea of equal rights for all citizens and fighting 
against any discrimination.  
Last but not least, in the last few years, the Bishop of the Catholic 
Church in Banjarmasin organized the so-called 'Open House' in which 
he invited Muslim leaders to come to visit him on the day of the New 
Year. The initiative of the Bishop is apparently a very good step to 
eradicate suspicions among Muslim politicians and leaders. It is 
noteworthy that during the gubernatorial elections of 2010, there was a 
rumor that the biggest Catholic Church in Asia was built in Batulicin. 
The Church is named Santo Vinsensius a Paulo, and it was blessed by 
the Vatican Ambassador on 1 October 2009. The rumor said that the 
permission to build the Church was given by the regent of the Tanah 
Bumbu district, and in return the regent received financial support 
from the Catholics for his gubernatorial elections campaign. The 
Catholic Church, however, decided to keep silence, to avoid further 
problems. Another case happened in 2011 in Kotabaru district. The 
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Catholic Church in Kotabaru already got the permission from the 
regent to renovate its church building and to move its kindergarten 
into inside area of the church. However, the permission was finally 
withdrawn by the regent because of demonstration against the plan. 
Again, in order to avoid further problems, the Catholics decided to 
keep silence. These two cases, therefore, indicate that the minorities 
are still vulnerable to political games and majority pressure.46  
 
Conclusion 
We have discussed the historical overview of the dynamics of 
inter-religious relations in South Kalimantan. As usual, there are 
continuities and changes along the line of history. Early conversion to 
Islam in the 16th century, and more intensive Islamization by the 18th 
century, can be seen as the formative period of Islam in this region. 
The encounter and clash between the new religion and the existing 
beliefs and practices were unavoidable. The dialectic between the two 
seems to lead to a kind of synthesis in which local religious culture was 
Islamized or at least transformed into a more Islamic one. By the late 
19th century, the clash seems to move to another target, namely the 
colonial power associated with Christianity. By this period, Islam was 
transformed from the court into people movement against the colonial 
power. Islam started to be organized in society, especially through the 
Sufi Order.  
By the first half of the 20th century, the problem of the 18th century 
apparently reappeared but with a different orientation. The reform of 
the 18th century was intended to ‘defeat’ the existing religious ‘rival’, 
while the reform of the 20th century was intended to make Islam more 
in line with modern rational ethos. The making of the Indonesian 
nation state by the second half of the 20th century pushed the 
Banjarese Muslims to be involved in the ideological debates, and even 
in a rebellion against the state. It was on this occasion that the politics 
of ethnic and religious identities led to the partition of the province. 
During the New Order period, the fear of Christianization and the 
socio-political frustration sometimes led to tensions between Muslims 
and Christians, and a riot even put the churches and viharas as the 
target of attack. In the Reformation Era, the challenges are mostly 
about the increasing plurality within and without Islam. There is no 
                                                          
46 Interview with Nugroho Susilo, 29 February 2016. 
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realistic choice but to face the plurality with dialogue. Fortunately, the 
recent trends seem to be positive, thanks to the political democracy of 
this era, even though the threat of radicalism and intolerance is also 
there. Probably, the most crucial issue in the future is whether the 
government can narrow the wide gap between the poor and the rich, 
and whether the environmental crisis because of deforestation, coal 
mining and palm oil companies can be managed. The Banjarese War of 
the 19th century and the riot of 1997 are good lessons telling us that 
social injustice will eventually lead to social unrest.[]  
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